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Countervailing Subsidization: Another
Missile in the Trade Law Arsenal?
Frangois E.J. Tougas*
I. Introduction
This article concentrates on the findings of the Canadian Import
Tribunal (CIT, predecessor to the Canadian International Trade
Tribunal) in their report entitled, Subsidized Grain Corn from the
United States of America (hereinafter referred to as Grain Corn).1
The CIT's report focused on the determination of whether subsidized
American grain corn had caused "material injury" to the domestic
Canadian industry of "like goods" pursuant to section 42 of the Spe-
cial Import Measures Act (SIMA).2 Notably, this was not the Cana-
dian government's first look at the issue of subsidization. Previously,
pursuant to section 31 of the same statute, the Department of Na-
tional Revenue, Customs and Excise had initiated an investigation
into various United States subsidies practices.
The Department's study determined that many farm programs
conferred domestic subsidies upon United States' grain corn produc-
ers which inured to the benefit of those producers.- Surprisingly
enough, the question of whether subsidies existed was not at issue.
The problem, however, was whether, in order for an investigating
country to apply countervailing duties to the subsidized imports of
another, a causal relationship between the injury and the impugned
subsidizing practice must be found to exist.
In this case, the import levels into Canada were so low that it
could hardly be said that American imports of any kind were caus-
* LL.B., University of British Columbia; A.B., Brigham Young University; currently
practicing in the field of international trade and investment with Lang Michener Lawrence &
Shaw in Vancouver, Canada. It should be noted that one of the partners of Lang Michener
Lash Johnston, John Richards, was counsel for the main respondent. Since this article was
written, that firm has merged with the author's firm, Lawrence & Shaw, to form the present
firm. Any bias toward the position of the respondents is purely coincidental therefore and not
the result of an overzealous reaction to the decisions which followed.
I. Canadian Import Tribunal, Subsidized Grain Corn from the United States of
America, CIT-7-86 [hereinafter Grain Corn].
2. Special Import Measures Act, 25 R.S.C. §§l et seq. (1984) [hereinafter SIMA].
SIMA essentially implements Canada's obligations under the Tokyo Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
3. Can. Gaz., July 12, 1986, at 3241.
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ing material injury. The argument of counsel for the petitioners,4
however, was that subsidization of United States grain corn rather
than subsidized imports was the cause of the injury, so that the ab-
sence of injurious imports was quite irrelevant to the cause of action.
Europeans, intrigued by the idea, monitored the Canadian investiga-
tion closely, while the Americans, 5 as well as many Canadians,
balked at the findings of the investigation. The question of material
injury and its link to subsidization rather than imports remains the
more intriguing aspect of the case as the Tribunal adjudicated upon
a claim arguably outside countervailing duty law as envisioned by
international agreement.
To understand the nature of the problem with which the CIT
dealt, it will be necessary to look at some of the background and
peculiarities of the regulation of international trade in commodities.
After a brief discussion of international and comparative discipline
in the area of trade impact, of which material injury is a part, Cana-
dian case law will be examined in order to establish trends in the
causal relationship between subsidization and material injury. This
examination will then proceed to a scrutiny of the findings of the
Tribunal with respect to Grain Corn and the real issue at hand, the
countervailability of subsidization rather than subsidized imports. A
brief summary of the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal will
follow.
Finally, alternate courses of action are analyzed for efficacy.
This analysis includes a comment on the futures of both the grain
trade in general and on practice before the Canadian Import
Tribunal.
II. Background
International competition in commodities in the twentieth cen-
tury, beset with a myriad of historical and sociological' complexities,
is fast approaching rationalization. The location of production is
shifting to developing countries at an unprecedented pace. This pace
has led, in turn, to a deterioration of the flimsy rules established to
regulate trade in what the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)7 terms "primary products."18 Indeed, as has been pointed
4. The Ontario Corn Producer's Association.
5. Wall Street Journal, July 3, 1986, at 2, col. 2.
6. See G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY: THE GENERAL AGREE-
MENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES AND
TECHNIQUES (1965).See also J. JACKSON AND W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 954 (2d ed. 1986) (citing G. Curzon with approval).
7. I General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [hereinafter GATT], BASIC INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 16:3, (1955) [hereinafter BISD]. See also Agreement on Interpre-
tation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII [hereinafter "Subsidies Code"].
8. BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 7.
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out, "although one cannot conclude generally that there are no rules
governing international trade in commodities, such rules as do exist
tend often to be ignored or to be very 'primitive,' in the sense of
being either ambiguous or minimal in their impact."9 For a country
such as Canada, the flexibility afforded by this lack of discipline has
been a two-edged sword. While the benefits of flexibility have pro-
tected domestic farm interests from the price and income fluctua-
tions inherent in commodities trade through the allocation of costs
and protection to consumers, in foreign markets the Canadian trea-
sury (again represented by the collective taxing of a broad popula-
tion base) has been no match for the goliaths of the agricultural
world, the European Community and the United States.
For Canada, and for other countries, therefore, agricultural
trade is far removed from the free-flowing trade envisioned by the
classical economists. Admittedly, little of the world's trade is free-
flowing, but trade in agricultural commodities is particularly prone
to distortions exceeding those of non-primary products (today, this
principally means non-agricultural products).1 Primary products
may, however, be subsidized to the detriment of aggrieved importing
nations. A common remedy for injury due to non-primary products
lies in the application of countervailing duties pursuant to the inter-
national discipline of GATT Article VI. 1" For primary products,
however, the likely policy response is the application of a counter-
vailing subsidy, rather than a duty. Without much foresight, one can
see the implication: depressed world prices. Additionally, a huge bur-
den on treasuries results and, as pointed out earlier, since a small
treasury can only subsidize by countervailing to the extent of its rev-
enue base, big treasuries survive longer than small treasuries.
It is no wonder then that Canadian corn growers were anxious
to be relieved of their plight in 1986 by requesting an investigation
of U.S. grain corn subsidies and their impact on Canadian produc-
ers. The output of American grain corn producers exceeded Cana-
dian production by twenty-five times" and a floor price mechanism,
such as that provided by the Canadian Wheat Board, was unavaila-
ble.13 These two factors, coupled with the inability of the domestic
industry to attract countervailing subsidies with which to compete,
were indicative of a deeply-rooted problem which could not have
been alleviated solely by imposing a countervailing duty. Desperation
9. J. JACKSON AND W. DAVEY, supra note 6, at 954. For an excellent, though dated,
discussion of trade in agricultural commodities, see K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 257 (1970).
10. See GATT, supra note 7.
I1. This is called Track I retaliation.
12. Grain Corn, supra note 1, at 9.
13. Id. at 34.
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was, in any event, a convenient reason for allowing the complainants,
who were primarily the Ontario Corn Producers' Association
(OCPA), to proceed with the investigation.' 4
III. The Discipline of Trade Impact
Trade impact refers to the effect of unfairly traded goods upon
domestic producers. Subsidized goods imported from abroad gener-
ally must have some sort of adverse impact on domestic producers of
similar products or "like goods." The particular standards used in
various circumstances has evoked debate over the years, and is born
of two particular schools of thought: the injury-only school and the
antidistortion school. The platforms of the two schools are described
by prominent researchers as follows:
Briefly, the injury-only school believes that a country should re-
taliate against foreign subsidies only when those subsidies exert
a significant impact on trade, and further, the remedy should be
designed to redress that impact. By contrast, the antidistortion
school believes that subsidies are a fit subject for retaliation even
if they exert only a slight impact on trade, and that retaliation
should be precisely designed to offset the subsidy."
Against this background several standards exist which are ap-
plied domestically and internationally to determine the appropriate
impact required to justify retaliation by one country against imports
from another country. The standards relevant to the discussion of the
Grain Corn 6 case are those outlined in the GATT and the Subsidies
Code. 17 They are known primarily as the standards of material in-
jury8 and adverse effects.'" "Adverse effects" includes the standards
of "nullification and impairment"2 and "serious prejudice."'" An
additional standard, "equitable share, ' 2 refers to the claim by one
country that another country may subsidize its exports as long as the
result does not give the exporting country "more than an equitable
share of world export trade in that product .... "I'
These standards are used for different, though sometimes over-
lapping purposes. "Material injury" is used when one country unilat-
erally24 investigates the subsidy practice(s) of another and further
14. The OCPA represents approximately 35,000 Ontario farmers.
15. G. HUFBAUER & J. SHELTON-ERB, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 19 (1984).
16. See supra note 1.
17. Id. See also infra note 18.
18. Subsidies Code, supra note 7, Art. 6:3 (interpreting GATT Art. Vi).
19. See Subsidies Code, supra note 7, Arts. 8:4, 11:2.
20. GATT, supra note 7, Art. XXIII.
21. GATT, supra note 7, Art. XVI:I.
22. GATT, supra note 7, Art. XVI:3.
23. GATT, supra note 7, Artt. XVI:3.
24. Unilateral investigation is equivalent to Track I retaliation. See supra notes I I and
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determines its impact on producers or competitors of like products
within the investigating country's jurisdiction (Track I retaliation).
This standard, while not the highest,2" requires a significant impact
on the importing country's industry. The criteria for determining
that impact are outlined in, but not limited to, Article 6 of the Sub-
sidies Code.2
"Adverse effects," and the standards associated with it, is used
in the context of multilateral retaliation, known as Track II retalia-
tion. 7 Under various circumstances, an aggrieved government2 8 may
petition the Subsidies Committee29 to establish a panel s° to seek re-
dress for import injury in circumstances where, in the case of either
of the adverse effects standards, the impact is felt in the importing
country, the subsidizing country, or in a third-country market.31
Primary products, defined for our purposes as unprocessed agri-
cultural products, 2 are accorded deferential treatment for both
Track I" and Track 1I13 retaliation purposes. The reason behind
that treatment is largely historical and has attracted the ire of devel-
oped and developing nations alike. In any event, agricultural subsi-
dies, especially export subsidies, have been the subject of successful
unilateral investigations. Multilateral retaliation has had to differen-
tiate between the impact standards depending on the location of the
impact, leading to mixed results. In the words of Hufbauer and
Shelton-Erb, 5 "subsidies on agricultural products remain virtually
free of international discipline. The only effective remedy is self-
help." 6
With these considerations in mind, the OCPA could have pur-
sued unlikely reprieve in Geneva or presented a novel argument in
Ottawa before the CIT. Because the latter approach was chosen, a
discussion of the jurisprudence in this area will ensue.
accompanying text.
25. "Serious" injury, as envisioned by Article XIX of the GATT, is a considerably
higher standard.
26. See BISD, supra note 7. These criteria are incorporated in Canadian law, in C.I.T.
Rules, No. 36, S.O.R. 85-1068).
27. This is called Track I1 retaliation. See supra note II and accompanying text.
28. That is, the government of the country allegedly being injured by impugned trade
practices of exporters of another country.
29. The Subsidies Committee was established by the Subsidies Code. See supra note 7,
art. 16.
30. The procedure whereby a panel may be requested or formed is found in the Subsi-
dies Code. See supra note 7, art. 16.
31. Subsidies Code, supra note 7, art. 8:4 and notes. 26-28.
32. Included in the Subsidies Code definition are "products of farm, forest, or fishery in
their natural form. BISD, supra note 7, at 31:259; Subsidies Code, supra note 7, art. 16
§B.
33. GATT, supra note 7, art. VI:7.
34. Subsidies Code, supra note 7, art. 10.
35. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 15, at 41.
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It is important, however, to understand the nature of the com-
plainant producer's argument before discussing jurisprudence. While
it is true that considerable subsidization was found,37 the material
injury necessary to be proved in this case was alleged to stem not
from United States imports, but from the effects of United States
legislation38 which drove down the commodity futures price in Chi-
cago. Because of the "open nature of the Canadian market these
lower prices were transferred to Canada, with substantial adverse ef-
fect on Canadian producers. ' 39 What seemed to be required under
international law-a causal connection between subsidized imports
and injury to the domestic industry-was relaxed so as to permit the
imposition of countervailing duties if complainants could establish a
sufficient connection between subsidization anywhere in the world,
regardless of the presence of imports in Canada and their impact on
the Canadian industry.4
IV. Causality as Demonstrated Through the Cases
Bearing in mind the nature of the complainant's argument in
the Grain Corn case and the international discipline surrounding
unilateral retaliation under Article VI of the GATT,4' one must ac-
knowledge that a sufficient nexus between the subsidies and the in-
jury is required. Whether or not subsidized imports must be the
cause of the injury to the domestic industry was the main issue in
Grain Corn. In order to determine where such an argument might
have had its genesis, some case law will be reviewed.
A. Whole Canned Tomatoes
Within the rubric SIMA,4  dumping and subsidies are dealt
with in a way which provides for specified periods of time in which
the Deputy Minister of National Revenue, Customs and Excise and
the CIT examine margins and injury respectively. While there are
separate SIMA provisions affecting dumping or subsidies exclusively,
in the case of injury determinations by the CIT, those provisions
only affect an issue"' subordinate to the principal question of past,
present and future injury.
On the surface, it would appear that injury determinations
37. Approximately one dollar per bushel on an average price of $2.39 per bushel.
38. Food Security Act of 1985 ("Farm Bill"), Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985)
(current version at 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1987)).
39. Grain Corn, supra note 1, at 14.
40. See Grain Corn, supra note 1. (dissenting opinion of Member Bissonnette).
41. This is also called Track I retaliation. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 2.
43. SIMA provisions, for instance, would only deal with whether imposition of retroac-
tive duties is necessary. See supra note 2, at § 42(l)(b), (c).
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should be treated identically since the cause of the injury, in order to
merit retaliation, must be the result of low-priced imports. Prior to
SIMA, however, the Anti-Dumping Tribunal,"" established pursuant
to the Anti-Dumping Act,4 5 usually treated subsidy cases in much
the same way as dumping cases; perhaps because subsidized imports
''were also being dumped and could therefore be dealt with by
means of anti-dumping proceedings. '46 For example, in two cases in-
volving Whole Canned Tomatoes,47 the earlier case treats subsidies
explicitly as dumping pursuant to section 16 of the then applicable
statute,4 8 while in the second and later case, while still under the
authority of section 16, the CIT makes an attempt at least to treat
the alleged injury as stemming from subsidized imports.9
Perhaps because dumping and subsidy cases have historically
been treated in the same manner, enacting SIMA appears to have
accomplished little in providing a remedy to this problem. In fact,
the bifurcated approach utilized by the GATT and the two Codes
which deals with these unfair trade practices are poorly reflected
even in SIMA. However, the two practices do require different treat-
ment. This is principally because dumping by definition involves im-
ports, whereas subsidization does not. Due to this difference, it is
possible to argue, as does the antidistortion school,50 that the rela-
tively high standard of material injury is not required to be reached
before countervailing duties can be applied. Complainant's counsel
in the second Whole Canned Tomatoes 1 case presented the follow-
ing argument. Counsel suggested that because the request to investi-
gate injury had come by Order-in-Council, pursuant to section 7 of
the Customs Tariff,52 the appropriate standard was injury, not mate-
rial injury.5 3 The Tribunal disagreed, preferring the argument of re-
spondent's counsel who viewed the threshold as defined by interna-
tional as well as some domestic legislation. 4
At this point, it is important to appreciate the connection be-
tween the threshold or standard of injury and causality (between
subsidy and injury). The standard of material injury requires impact
to be of a fairly substantial nature. This is the standard that was
adopted by the Contracting Parties to the GATT and signatories to
44. The Anti-Dumping Tribunal was the forerunner of the Canadian Import Tribunal.
45. Anti-Dumping Act, R.S.C. ch, A-15 (1970).
46. R. PATERSON, CANADIAN REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
142 (1986).
47. 3 A.D.T. 1978, IC A.D.T. 1983.
48. See, supra note 45.
49. ADT-IC-83.
50. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
51. ADT-IC-83.
52. R.S.C. ch. C-41 (1970).
53. ADT-IC-83 at 38.
54. ACT-IC-83, AT 39.
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the Subsidies Code, and consequently by Canada. This effectively
means that the standard used by the antidistortion school is not part
of the law of Canada. Causality, therefore, cannot be found merely
because there is distortion in the marketplace as a result of subsidi-
zation in one or several countries. Subsidized imports, on the other
hand, where they cause material injury to domestic producers of like
products, are countervailable.
It is tempting, however, to treat the difference between those
injuries due to subsidized imports and those due to subsidization as a
question of direct and indirect injury. Were one to do so, a decision
of the Federal Court of Appeal might obstruct such treatment. Jus-
tice Hugessen, in speaking for the court in the Acieries case,55 de-
scribed the difference between those injuries due to dumped imports
and those due to dumped inventories as follows:
I do not find it helpful, in these circumstances, to talk in terms
of "direct" and "indirect" causes; nor does the glorification of
those expressions with Latin tags (causa causans, causa sine
qua non) bring any enlightenment. In law, as opposed to meta-
physics, the study of causes is the examination of the potency of
certain facts in the production of certain results. Realistically
this is a question of fact. It only becomes a question of law by
the device of a reviewing tribunal declaring it to be so and as-
serting, generally on an a priori basis, that the alleged cause
could not have produced the alleged effect. The present case is a
far cry from anything of that sort. Simple common sense would
indicate that the introduction of a large amount of goods at low
prices into a market at a time when it is in a process of rapid
contraction is capable of producing material injury to the other
participations in that market. That is exactly what was found as
a fact by the Tribunal in the exercise of the expertise which is
its raison d'etre. Conceivably it was wrong to do so, but it com-
mitted no error of law or jurisdiction. For these reasons, I would
not interfere with its finding that the dumping has caused and is
causing material injury.56
B. Boneless Manufacturing Beef
5 7
From this case emerged perhaps the most significant factor un-
derlying the CIT's treatment of Grain Corn.58 The facts of the case
reveal that United States imports of European Community Beef had
55. Sacilor Acieries, Forges et Acieries Dilling and Francosteel Canada Inc v. The Anti-
Dumping Tribunal, Algoma Steel Corp., Stelco Inc., and Dofasco Inc., 9 C.E.R. 210, 60 N.R.
371 (1985).
56. 60 N.R., at 375.
57. C.I.T.-2-86. The finding was dated July 25, 1986. See 12 C.E.R. 62 (1986).
58. Grain Corn, supra note 1.
[Vol. 8:1
COUNTERVAILING SUBSIDIZATION
been limited to 5000 tons annually; while Canada, in 1984, had im-
ported five times that amount. Canadian importers acted as a con-
duit to the "prime export destination" (the United States) of that
beef; as a result the United States National Cattlemen's Association
and Congress had threatened Canada with retaliation.5 9 This threat
was considered to be a material injury, not conjectural or specula-
tive, 60 because "the livestock market will remain a North American
market; ... [and] United States pricing will remain the principal
determinant of Canadian pricing ... "61
Both of these findings arose in Grain Corn.62 The main differ-
ence was that duties were applied against injurious imports, while
the causal element occurred in a continental market with a continen-
tal price.
Could it be that the CIT in Grain Corn, faced with a similar
dilemma only eight months before in the Boneless Manufacturing
Beef case, sought to remedy an apparent cavity in the Canadian
trade arsenal? In both cases, the CIT was dealing with the threat of
injury when it made critical findings in the face of considerable dis-
pute from respondents' counsel. By recognizing the continentality of
market and price, future claimants would be able to look to condi-
tions outside Canada, extrinsic to the territory of importation, and,
in turn, base an action on those conditions. Insufficiently armed to
retaliate against generally unfair trade practices, the CIT in Grain
Corn appears to have taken upon itself the magnitude of the United
States President's powers in section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.3
C. Dry Pasta"'
The effects of pricing mechanisms and a continental market
have been previously considered by the CIT. In the Dry Pasta case,
intra-industry price competition was the most significant factor in
deciding against a finding of injury. The existence of a domestic
price fixed by the Canadian Wheat Board distinguished this case
from Grain Corn because Canadian wheat, an input into dry pasta,
acted within a solely national market. It could not be said that a
price set in Chicago was the same price for which Canadian produc-
ers competed. Conditions outside Canada, therefore, were irrelevant
to the determination of causality, while no indication is given as to
whether the CIT might otherwise have considered the Chicago price.
59. C.I.T.-2-86 at 20. See also, 12 C.E.R. 83, 84 (1986).
60. C.I.T.-2-86 at 21. See also, 12 C.E.R. 84 (1986).
61. C.I.T.-2-86 at 21.
62. Grain Corn, supra note 1, at 13-14.
63. 19 U.S.C. 2411-2416 (1987) (amending Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 295 (1979)); see
also Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3002 (1984).
64. CIT-5-86. The finding was dated January 28, 1987.
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D. Fresh, Whole, Yellow Onions6 5
In the Fresh, Whole, Yellow Onions case, the western regional
market was separated pursuant to SIMA. 6 British Columbia prices
for onions were determined by Washington prices, 7 and the neces-
sary causal link between dumping and injury was established by ref-
erence to the volume of imports, the large inventories upon which
British Columbia importers could call to fill demand, and the need
for British Columbia producers to "dispose of their crop at market
prices which were established on the basis of, and fluctuated with,
prices prevailing in the United States." 8 Because imports were in-
volved, there was no indication whether, absent imports, the U.S.-
dictated price would have been sufficient to find a threat of material
injury.
From these cases, it is difficult to establish whether Grain Corn
is an aberration or whether continentality remains a factor, 9 if not a
dominant characteristic, in developing a causal. connection test that
meets Canada's international obligations. Whatever the case, Grain




The argument presented by complainant's counsel and accepted
by the majority of the CIT (member Bissonnette dissenting) in
Grain Corn has already been set forth. 71 A possible explanation for
the conclusion reached has also been canvassed, 72 speculative though
it may be. Respectfully, the preferred opinion is that rendered by
Member Bissonnette, at least as a matter of principle. The result is
another question entirely and will be approached later." It is unnec-
essary to review the entire content of the Tribunal's decision. There-
fore, only issues critical to the determination of the finding will be
discussed.
A. The Majority Decision
One of the many factors to which the CIT will look in determin-
ing the impact of subsidized goods is the "increase in the financial
65. CIT-l-87. The finding was dated April 30, 1987. This investigation concerned
dumping rather than subsidies.
66. SIMA, supra note 42, at § 42(3).
67. CIT-1-87 at 3.
68. Id. at 8.
69. See Colour Television Receiving Sets, CIT-13-85; 11 C.E.R. 168 (1985).
70. Grain Corn, supra note 1. The finding was dated March 6, 1987.
71. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
73. See Part V, infra.
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burden on a federal or provincial government agricultural support
program in Canada.""' The Tribunal had no difficult finding the nec-
essary increased burden on the Canadian treasury,7" but the minor-
ity differed as to the issue of causality. The CIT characterized the
respondent's argument as follows:
Counsel representing parties in opposition to this complaint ar-
gued that the material injury claimed to have been suffered
must relate to subsidized imports and not simply to the fact of
subsidization found by the Deputy Minister to exist in a foreign
country. Use of the term "subsidized imports" in Article 6 of
the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties (Subsidies
Code), which sets out conditions for the determination of injury,
is relied upon by counsel in support of this argument. While no
identical term appears in the Special Import Measures Act, and
specifically in section 42 which is the authority under which in-
quiries of the Tribunal are conducted, counsel submitted that
the expression "subsidized goods" is used in such a way that
there is an underlying assumption that the only subsidized goods
the Act is concerned with are imported subsidized goods.76
The Canadian producer's counsel argued for a broad, relief-ori-
ented reading of section 42 of SIMA,7 7 claiming that a narrow inter-
pretation would undermine the original intent and purpose of the
Act which was to provide protection for Canadian producers from
unfair and harmful import competition." The majority, in looking to
the Subsidies Code for guidance, eventually sided with the complain-
ant.79 In the Subsidies Code, the majority found a policy basis on
which it could base its conclusion:
Both the Special Import Measures Act and the GATT Subsidies
Code exist for the express purpose of dealing with unfairly
traded goods which cause or threaten injury. Necessarily, their
provisions must be interpreted, not in the abstract, but within
the context of the environment within which they apply, namely,
international trade. Since the economic and commercial realities
of international trade dictate that price be met or market share
lost, the majority of the panel is persuaded to adopt the broader
interpretation of "subsidized imports," that is, that cognizance
be taken of potential or likely imports in the determination of
material injury. To do otherwise, in the view of the majority of
74. CIT Rules, SOR/85-1068, no. 35(c)(iii). See also, Subsidies Code, supra note 7, at
art. 6:3.
75. Grain Corn, supra note 1, at 28, notes 7, 8.
76. Id. at 15.
77. SIMA, supra note 42.
78. Grain Corn, supra note 1, at 15.
79. Id. at 15-16.
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the panel, would be to frustrate the purpose of the system 80
To this author's surprise, and undoubtedly to the respondent's
as well, the focus on imports was ill-conceived in the view of the
majority:
In the case of grain corn, imports into Canada have existed in
recent years, albeit at modest levels. The issue, therefore, is not
whether imports have taken place, but whether they would have
increased substantially in the absence of a price response by the
domestic producers to the subsidized United States corn. Given
the openness of the Canadian market, much higher levels of im-
ports would have been a certainty. (emphasis added)8"
Respectfully, the assertion that imports should ever be outside
the focus of the Tribunal's inquiry is unsupportable. The very name
of the Tribunal expressly identifies its duties. Member Bissonnette,
in the dissenting judgment, took exception to the conclusion.
B. The Minority Decision
In the view of Member Bissonnette, serious injury resulted from
world oversupply to which the United States' subsidization program
had contributed. As a result of export-oriented corn production due
to the United States' role as world supplier, Chicago prices set world
prices. Consequently, Canadian suppliers must sell within their own
market at United States prices. Nevertheless, this "has nothing to do
with subsidization." 82 The answer is simply that even without a sin-
gle export to Canada, Canadian prices rise and fall with the United
States price as long as an "open trading policy" exists. The injury is
due to the Canadian obligation to dispose of crops, as in Yellow On-
ions,83 at the depressed United States price.84 Yet, without imports
to contribute to the injury, Member Bissonnette was unable to find
any merit to the countervailing claim.83
Upon reviewing the actual effects of the 1985 United States
Farm Bill 6 and trade statistics dating back beyond the investigation
period, Member Bissonnette commented that the real purpose of the
1985 Bill was to cut back on the level of subsidization hitherto pre-
sent, and to return to more competitive market forces by cutting
down on United States production. Member Bissonnette also re-
viewed other factors contributing to the injury suffered by Canadian
80. Id. at 16. (Emphasis added).
81. id.
82. Grain Corn, supra note I, at 23.
83. CIT-I-87. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
84. Grain Corn, supra note 1, at 23.
85. Id. at 24.




Because of the array of factors other than subsidization which
impacted world prices it was all the more important, in my opin-
ion, that the injury suffered be related to subsidized imports,
and not simply to the availability of trans-border stocks at de-
pressed world prices.87
Member Bissonnette referred to SIMA, the Subsidies Code and
the GATT to emphasize the need for subsidized imports in establish-
ing a causal relationship with the injury. He noted that Rule 36 of
the CIT's General Rules of Practice and Procedure88 particularly
adopts the Code criteria.89 He then compared the approach taken by
other members of the GATT, notably the United States and the Eu-
ropean Economic Community."
In concluding, Member Bissonnette stated that while there were
some United States imports entering Canada, it was not the subsi-
dized imports which caused the injury but world oversupply. The in-
jury suffered "is not the kind for which SIMA and the GATT have
provided a remedy ... ." The theory of indirect injury created by
the Acieries decision92 was broadened by the majority, but may have
been confined to its facts had the minority prevailed.
A short time after the decision was issued, the CIT, for the first
time, asked for public interest representations to be made pursuant
to section 45 of SIMA. The purpose of the section is to inquire
whether a reduction in or the elimination of a duty is in the public
interest. Issuing a lengthy report, the CIT decided that a reduction
would best serve the public interest. 93 Indeed, not only consumers,
but producers, exporters and importers would benefit from the re-
duction as well.
Whether resort to other remedies, either domestic or interna-
tional, should have been pursued initially remains a question of strat-
egy, the details of which are not known to this writer. Those reme-
dies will, in any event, be examined. First, however, brief mention of
the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal is in order.
The issues were clearly defined as the dispute moved to the Fed-
eral Court of Appeal.9 4 First, the Court considered whether counter-
vailing duties could be imposed in the absence of significant amounts
87. Grain Corn, supra note 1, at 27.
88. SOR/85-1068. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
89. Subsidies Code, supra note 7, at Art. 6.
90. Grain Corn, supra note 1, at 30.
91. Id. at 34.
92. 9 C.E.R. 210, 60 N.R. 371 (1985). See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
93. Report on Public Interest Representations; see Grain Corn, supra note 1.
94. National Corn Growers Association v. Canadian Import Tribunal; St. Lawrence
Starch Company Limited et al. v. CIT; American Farm Bureau Federation v. CIT (1988) 2
Trade and Commodity Tax Cases 4053; 1 Canada Trade and Sales Tax Cases 2085.
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of imports of the subject goods. On this point, the majority con-
cluded that duties could be imposed on the basis of its reading of
SIMA section 42. The majority also concluded that the statute was
clear and unambiguous in its terms and that it further authorized
the finding of material injury as the CIT had concluded. This con-
clusion was based on a plain reading of the section which, far from
making any reference to imports, refers instead to the "subsidizing
of the goods." Secondly, because of the majority's construction of
section 42, it was unnecessary, in the eyes of the Chief Justice, to go
behind the legislation and make reference to extrinsic materials. The
Chief Justice stated:
To hold that "imports" should be added to Section 42 so
that the Section is to be interpreted by the terms of the
underlying treaty provisions puts the Court into a role of
assuming that Parliament unequivocally intended to abide
by specific provisions of international agreements in spite
of its use in clear language to the contrary. Courts are not
authorized to do this; indeed it is wrong for them to do so.
Intrinsic provisions of the legislation can be looked at to
conclude that parliament intended to implement the
treaty, but that fact cannot be used to have the treaty
words and meaning override what is otherwise clear lan-
guage in Section 42.11
Numerous portions of the decision by the majority further support
the acceptance of the supremacy of Parliament as opposed to the
internatioanl obligations imposed by treaties and agreements to
which Canada is party.96 The minority was considerably less inclined
to follow the course dictated by the majority and insisted on the in-
tent of Parliament, which was undoubtedly to implement Canada's
obligations as they are found in the GATT and the Subsidies Code.
VI. International and Domestic Remedies
A. International Remedies
In Part II, ante, reference was made to Track II retaliation as
distinguished from unilateral retaliation. Track I retaliation has the
obvious advantage, where it is available, of allowing private com-
plainants access to essentially domestic remedies. Track II retalia-
tion, on the other hand, has two distinct disadvantages. First, be-
cause the forum is international, private parties lack standing,
requiring the efforts of the aggrieved party to marshal government
95. 2 TCT 4059; 1 TST 2094.
96. Leave to appeal granted, Supreme Court of Canada Bulletin, June 22, 1989, 1759
(leave to appeal granted).
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machinery to act on its behalf. Consequently, political and diplo-
matic considerations may interfere in the decision whether to make
an appeal to the GATT. Second, because the remedy is multilateral,
a certain degree of unanimity is also required on the part of Con-
tracting Parties to the GATT or Signatories to the Code.
It is no wonder then that the OCPA97 preferred the remedy
available through SIMA. Coincidentally, the choice was rewarding
because the majority of the CIT preferred their position, as did the
Federal Court of Appeal. Member Bissonnette remarked that neither
the GATT nor SIMA provided a remedy for this particular injury.
An argument could have been made on the basis of SIMA section
7.98 which would require an investigation to be ordered by the Gov-
ernor in Council9" when the Deputy Minister of National Revenue
has determined the amount of the subsidies, 100 when the Track II
procedure has been initiated, and when the Subsidies Committee
"has authorized Canada to impose countervailing duties on such sub-
sidized goods,"'' 1 and all of which fallow on the recommendation of
the Minister of Finance.102 Whether Member Bissonnette intended
to limit the use of section 7 relief by his comment is not clear.
Alternatively, by request of the Government of Canada, the
OCPA could have turned to the GATT's Art. XXIII "nullification
or impairment" remedy. This approach requires a demonstration
that measures taken by the United States subsequent to tariff negoti-
ations nullified or impaired Canada's benefits (namely, tariff conces-
sions). "The primary question in a nullification or impairment case is
whether the subsequent measures have a harmful trade effect that
defeats the legitimate expectations of the impacted country."' 0 3 Pur-
suant to Subsidies Code Art. 8:3, signatories have an obligation to
avoid causing through the use of any subsidy:
(a) injury to the domestic industry of another signatory,
(b) nullification or impairment of the benefits accruing di-
rectly or indirectly to another signatory under the General
Agreement, or
(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another signatory.'04
Finally, Article 10 of the Code, concerned solely with export
subsidies on certain primary products, can offer relief. Utilization of
this article, however, requires a showing that the 1981 and 1985
97. Ontario Corn Producer's Ass'n, complainant in Grain Corn, supra note 1.
98. SIMA, supra note 42, at § 7(1).
99. Id.
100. Id. at § 7(l)(a).
101. Id. at § 7(l)(b).
102. Id. at § 7(1).
103. G. HUFBAUER AND J. SHELTON-ERB, supra note 15, at 33.
104. Id.
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United States Farm Bills actually grant export subsidies in the form
of production or domestic subsidies; this is an argument which is not
likely to stand.
B. Domestic Remedies
While section 7 of SIMA is arguably quasi-domestic/interna-
tional remedy, in that it provides international relief via municipal
legislation, section 7 of the Customs Tariff is purely domestic and
offers the widest scope for relief in Canadian trade law. The act
states:
(2) Notwithstanding this or any other Act of Parliament,
for the purpose of
(a) enforcing Canada's rights under a trade agree-
ment in relation to a country, or
(b) responding to acts, policies or practices of the
government of a country that, as a result of discrimina-
tion or otherwise, adversely affect or lead directly or in-
directly to adverse effects on trade in Canadian goods or
services,
the Government in Council may, on the recommendation of the
Minister of Finance and the Secretary of State for External Af-
fairs, by order do any one or more of the following things in
relation to-that country:
(c) suspend or withdraw rights or privileges
granted by Canada under a trade agreement or an Act
of Parliament;
(d) make any goods that are the product of that
country or any class of such goods subject to a surtax in
an amount, over and above the rate of customs duty
specified in Schedule A for such goods or class of goods,
not exceeding thirty-three and one-third per cent ad
valorem;
(e) include on the Import Control List established
under section 5 of the Export and Import Permits Act
any goods that are the product of that country; and
(f) establish, in respect of any goods or class of
goods that are the product of that country, rates of cus-
toms duty, not exceeding at the maximum the rate to
which the customs duty on such goods or class of goods
could be increased under paragraph (d), that vary from
time to time as the quantity of such goods or class of
goods imported into Canada during a specified period of
time equals or exceeds specified totals." 5
105. SIMA, supra note 42, at C-41.
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It has been argued elsewhere.0 6 that pre-authorization from the
Subsidies Committee wou'd be necessary prior to the use of section 7
if Canada is to stay within its international obligations. It is plausi-
ble, but not likely, that the provision is simply the statutory authori-
zation for the imposition of such sanctions pursuant to Track II au-
thorization. 07 In the absence of diplomatic considerations, one may
envision the use of section 7 in a manner similar to section 301108 in
the United States. On a reciprocal basis, section 301 no more con-
forms to international discipline than does section 7 of the Customs
Tariff, although there is a requirement that the United States "initi-
ate consultations and, if necessary, dispute settlement procedures in
GATT .. . ."109 Realistically, however, the remedies go far beyond
what is available internationally and require little, if any, multilat-
eral authorization. The President of the United States, in other
words, "can use his section 301 powers even in the absence of a
GATT recommendation." ' 0
The Canadian section 7 of the Customs Tariff could then be
used as a form of foreboding retaliation, as in the case of United
States section 301, pursuant to which an action is most fruitful when
threatened. Assuming the necessary ingredients of credibility and
competence around which a threat can be sustained, grain growers
might obtain a hope of relief. On the other hand, the American pro-
vision has had its share of problems as well, and the economic
brinksmanship of retaliatory strikes may be the kind of war that
neither the Canadian diplomatic ethic nor its treasury could sustain.
Perhaps the harshest threat of all would be the imposition of a
quota. Of course, the threat of the reciprocal treatment of Canadian
grain abroad mitigates the use of such a threat. Nothing so harsh,
therefore, is suggested.
VII. Conclusion
A. The Future of Grain Trade Regulation
Three events have occurred around which a grain trade regula-
tion framework might be established. Some have given rise to regu-
latory documents, while some are in their formation stages. These
include the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,"' the
Agenda of the (Uruguay Round), of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
106. R. PATERSON, supra note 46, at 146-47.
107. The case law is an empty set, however. This makes it difficult to determine the
legislative intent of the section.
108. Trade Act of 1974, see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
109. J. JACKSON AND W. DAVEY, supra note 9, at 804.
110. G. HUFBAUER AND J. SHELTON-ERB, supra note 15, at 114.
Ill. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Canada-United States Free Trade Im-
plementing Act, S.C. 1988, c.65, Schedule-Part A.
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tions, 1 2 and the Reagan Proposals of July 6, 19 8 7 .1a3 Their perti-
nence to the issues at hand, settling of the grain corn dispute and
alleviating the plight of Canadian grain corn growers, are only gen-
erally apparent but point to the resolution of these and other grain
trade problems in the future.
First, the Free Trade Agreement contains several provisions
which could substantially alter trade in grain corn. 1 4 The parties
duplicate their already publicly-declared intention to work together
to achieve the global elimination of subsidies. Furthermore, the par-
ties commit to neither "introduce nor maintain any export subsidy"
on goods destined to remain within the free trade area, nor to allow
public bodies to dump within the area. An attempt to manage export
competition in third country markets also finds itself in the agree-
ment.' 5 Article 703 gratuitously sets to print a promise for the par-
ties to work together to eliminate the trade barriers to each other's
agricultural markets.
Corn is conspicuously absent from Article 705:1-4, but reap-
pears in Article 705:5 to provide for the retention of the parties' pre-
existing rights to introduce quotas on certain conditions. This is an
apparent rift in the inevitable continental market which may have
preceded the Free Trade Agreement in any event. Obviously, since
domestic subsidies on grain are not covered by the agreement, the
decision in Grain Corn probably would not have been decided any
differently; at least not for the reasons elicited, but the judicial re-
view provisions might have made the difference.
The second event, the Uruguay Round, produced a skeletal
agenda assuring the contracting parties to the GATT that agricul-
ture is back on the negotiating table. Within this forum, Canada's
agricultural interests are being pursued along three fronts. Unilater-
ally, Canada is assuming a trade posture that would reduce the cur-
rent levels of subsidization in commodities. Moreover, as previously
stated, the United States and Canada have agreed that they will
work with each other bilaterally and in the GATT to further im-
prove and enhance trade in agriculture. Multilaterally, Canada
forms a part of the Cairns Group of Nations dedicated to eliminat-
ing subsidies in agriculture. The group has formed a negotiating alli-
ance for the Uruguay Round.
The third and perhaps most precatory event, emanates from a
United States proposal to end all agricultural subsidies by the year
112. GATT, Draft Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, MIN (86)/w/19, 20
Sept. 1986, Punta del Este, Uruguay, p. I1.
113. Backgrounder, United States Embassy, Ottawa, Canada, 7 July 1987.
114. Agreement, supra note 107, Ch.7 at Arts. 701, 703 & 705. There are other provi-
sions dealing with agricultural products as well.
115. Id. at Art. 701:1-4.
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2000. The few days surrounding the press release generated discus-
sion mostly devoted to criticism,11 but this writer takes exception to
the attack on the substance of the proposal. The critics' assault fo-
cuses on the wrong question. The very suggestion that the elimina-
tion of subsidies is an acceptable option bodes well for Canada's
interests.
B. Lessons from the CIT
Many questions remain concerning the injuries resulting from
Canada's grain trade problems. Should complainants now be able to
bring actions against importers and their sources based on indirect
injury? What kind of defenses will be available to respondents and
how will they prepare for remedies arguably extrinsic to that sanc-
tioned by international agreement?
Clayton Yeutter, the former United States Trade Representa-
tive and present Secretary of Agriculture, is reported to have said
that "if this finding were to be followed by other countries it could
severely damage the credibility of the countervailing duty and safe-
guard process everywhere and lead to a rash of protectionist actions
throughout the world. 11 7 The latter clause is no doubt instigated by
self-interest. Other countries have foreseen the fact that the United
States programs could be subject to countervailability within their
respective trade regimes. The former clause, however, is sympto-
matic of the deterioration in subsidies discipline since the gains made
during the Tokyo Round. Exaggeration aside, Secretary Yeutter is
probably correct. If countries adopted the reasoning of the majority
of the CIT, anomalous results and a breakdown of the international
subsidies framework, which requires direct injury prior to unilateral
retaliation, would ensue.
Future complainants can now, with impunity, raise arguments
addressing allegations of indirect injury. Because of the similarity of
the two regimes, anti-dumping complaints might involve the same
strategy as subsidization complaints in injury determinations. Re-
spondents, on the other hand, should continue to argue against the
application of any test which permits indirect injury to be consid-
ered. Because indirect injury is so closely connected to questions of
threats of injury or future injury, respondents might further apply
for stringent standards to be used in assessing the likelihood of in-
jury from the alleged perpetrator. Also, respondents should prepare,
but only as a last resort (so as to not appear to be tacitly accepting
the legitimacy of indirect injury), arguments demonstrating the non-
116. Financial Post, July 13, 1987, at 14, col. 1; Globe and Mail, July 28, 1987, at B6,
col. 2.
117. Vancouver Sun, Mar. 7, 1987, at C12; Globe and Mail, Mar. 7, 1987, at B5.
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injurious nature of the practice complained of while maintaining the
need for the complainant to show the likelihood of injurious imports.
Exporters from Canada are also affected in that they can expect
retaliatory measures unrelated to the corn trade to be levelled
against them in the event that other countries duplicate the Cana-
dian action against the United States. The logic here is that a spate
of retaliatory actions, which would damage Canadian exports, will
be levied by the United States to combat the imposition of arguably
unjustified countervailing duties against exports of United States
grain of all kinds, not just corn.
Consequently, the creation of a new non-tariff barrier by the
CIT is neither in the best interests of Canadian importers and ex-
porters, nor is it sanctioned internationally. Apparently, only domes-
tic judicial review, the preferred route, or international judicial de-
termination, which is considered the most costly and embarrassing
choice, will remedy the decision in Grain Corn.1 8
118. The United States sought "emergency consultations" under the auspices of the
GATT on April 27, 1987. The Subsidies Committee is to have considered the matter and
decided whether to establish a dispute panel. See also supra note 96.
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